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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/ Appellee 
v. 
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20070534-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103 (2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's intent to steal a computer? 
Standard of Review: "When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the 
evidence is insufficient, . . . '[w]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict[, and w]e reverse . . . 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ^  15,167 P.3d 503 
(quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)).1 
2. Whether the court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for arrest of 
judgment based on prosecutorial misconduct? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to 
arrest judgment based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, \ 10, 167 P.3d 517. 
STATUTES AND RULE 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-401, -402, -404 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with theft, a class A misdemeanor. Rl-2, 181-82. At the 
close of evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the case for insufficient evidence. R287:162. 
The trial court denied the motion. R287:163. A jury convicted defendant. R226. Defendant 
moved to arrest the judgment, claiming prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence. 
R237-47. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R286:l-14. The court sentenced 
defendant to a jail term of 365 days, but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on 
1
 Since defendant relies on the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of 
evidence, and not the court's denial of his claim of insufficient evidence on his motion to arrest 
judgment for preservation of this claim, see Aplt. Br. at 2, the standard of review is that 
applied to review of a jury's verdict. Cf. State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ f 41, 70 P.3d 
111 ("When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient 'believable evidence' to 
withstand a challenge at the close of the State's case in chief, we apply the same standard 
used when reviewing a jury verdict.") (citation omitted). 
2 
probation for 12 months conditioned upon 75 hours of community service and a cognitive 
restructuring class. R270-71. Defendant timely appealed. R274. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's Case-in-Chief 
Alan Myers met defendant in San Diego in early July 2003, when Myers was 
commuting back and forth from Utah, doing contract work for a data processing company. 
R287:80. They discussed a bitless bridle that defendant had designed. R287:50,79. Myers 
was intrigued with the bridle and, after speaking with defendant on a couple of occasions, 
suggested that defendant see him when he came to Salt Lake City. R287:51. 
In late July, defendant and his girlfriend, Pat, arrived in Utah with "most of their stuff 
in the car." R287:51, 81. Myers offered his basement to defendant and Pat until they all 
figured out how to help the couple "back on their feet." Id. When no opportunities arose, 
Myers suggested that he and defendant might start a website to sell the bridles. R287:51. 
Myers built a website and several months later Myers and defendant formed a 
partnership-Supreme Calvary-to sell the bridles. R287:51-52. 
The partnership was a "50/50 agreement." R287:53. Myers was to contribute his 
computer and website expertise, business relations and Internet contacts, and account credit. 
Id. Defendant was to market the bridle, contact people, and sell the bridle. Id. All the 
money put into the business-to maintain the website and pay for services-came from Myers' 
computer business, Myers' personal account with Wells Fargo, to which defendant's name 
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was added, and a business account in Myers' name, dba Supreme Calvary. R287:53, 56. 
Defendant did not contribute any money, in spite of an agreement that each partner would 
contribute $ 100 to the Wells Fargo bank account. R287:53-54. The partnership never owned 
any assets. R287:56. Myers alone supported the business with his personal income and his 
own computer business. Id. Any computers used in partnership belonged only to Myers, and 
the computer defendant was later charged with stealing from Myers' home was never 
partnership property. R287:56, 72. Myers paid for that computer, all of its hardware and 
software components, including the programs and Internet access, and the monitor and 
keyboard. R287:73-74. 
In the summer of 2004, Myers recognized that the partnership was not selling bridles 
and that he was seeing only a cash outflow from his personal resources and business account. 
R287:54. He continued to work with defendant, but asked him to find a part-time job to pay 
for his room and board and some of the business expense. Between August and October 
2004, Myers sold only one bridle. Id. In late January 2005, after Myers insisted that 
defendant help support himself, defendant got a job working as a live-in caretaker for Valerie 
Brown. R287:54-55. Until then, defendant had lived rent-free in Myers' basement. R287:52, 
54, 88-89. After securing the caretaker job, defendant deposited one paycheck into the 
partnership's joint account. R287:55. Defendant, however, withdrew more money from the 
account than he deposited. R287:75. 
Defendant had sued a Dr. Cook, his former partner, over the patent on the bridle. 
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R287:55. After defendant moved out of Myers' home, he would usually come by the home 
two days a week and work from around 8:00 am to 1:00 pm on his lawsuit. R287: 55, 91. 
Myers never denied defendant permission to enter his home after defendant moved out. Id. 
At that time, the Supreme Calvary website and accounts were still operative, and Myers still 
considered that he and defendant were in business together. R287:55, 89. 
The computer defendant stole was purchased by Myers in 2002. R287:57. Myers and 
his son rebuilt the computer several times because of virus problems. R287:57, 59, 63. 
Typically, Myers would rebuild his computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or 
Microsoft Office 2003 Professional and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. Id. He might also 
add other development tools for web development. Id. Myers owned the licenses associated 
with these programs. R287:57. 
Myers owned at least six computers, including the one defendant stole, which were 
all networked together. R287:58. Myers moved the computer in question into the family 
room, where all of his family and he used it until it was stolen. It was the only computer 
Myers allowed defendant to use. R287:60. When it was later examined by a governmental 
agency, only data files belonging to defendant were found. R287:60-62; State's Exhibit 1. 
Myers and his family vacationed from the 19th to the 28th of August 2005. R287:64. 
Defendant had permission to enter the house to feed Myers' pets while he was away. Id. 
Myers also gave defendant permission to use the computer, as he always had "to do his 
lawsuit stuff." R287:64-65. However, Myers had never allowed defendant to take the 
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computer from the house, and he did not give his permission to take it while he was away. 
R287:65,71. 
When Myers returned home on August 28, he found a letter from defendant, dated 
August 23. R287:65, 70. Although Myers had helped defendant fix his car and given him 
money and free room and board, defendant derided Myers' personal, spiritual, and financial 
integrity, complaining that Myers was "dominating, manipulating, power hungry," claiming, 
in the language of Biblical scripture, that Myers was spiritually deficient, and insisting that 
Myers' had repeatedly failed to adequately support their partnership. R287:65-66; State's 
Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2 (Addendum B). Defendant asked Myers to send him receipts and 
photographs related to Spirit Bridle and to shut down Supreme Calvary and its website. 
State's Exhibit 3, p. 2. Defendant further wrote that he took Myers computer because it had 
all of his personal "stuff on it and that he would pay fair market value when he obtained 
appropriate funds. R287:65; State's Exhibit 3, p. 2. The letter did not indicate either what 
amount or when defendant would pay for the computer. R287:66. It was signed, "Rev. 
Edward Allan Buck." State's Exhibit 3, p. 2. 
Myers understood the letter to terminate defendant's business relationship with him. 
R287:66. Although the letter had a Las Vegas return address, it did not have a telephone 
number. R287:67; State's Exhibit 3, p. 1. Myers tried to reach defendant at the only phone 
number in Las Vegas he had for him, without success. R287:66. He then called Valerie 
Brown, and, based on his feeling that her response was "not right," decided to drive by her 
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residence. R287;69-70. When Myers drove by Brown's residence the next day, he saw 
defendant's car there. R287:70. Following the instructions of his insurance company to file 
a police report, Myers called the sheriffs department. R287:69-71. 
Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff Tracy Boughn received Myers' complaint about the 
stolen computer. R287:116-17. After talking with Myers, Deputy Boughn directed dispatch 
to have an officer contact defendant. R287:l 17-18. When Deputy Boughn arrived at 
Brown's residence, he found two officers talking with defendant outside the premises. 
R287:119. Defendant did not appear to the deputy to understand why the police were there. 
R287:126. Defendant said he was a business partner with Myers and allowed Deputy 
Boughn to accompany him into Brown's house. R287:120-21. Inside, the deputy saw the 
computer, monitor, and keyboard on a table. R287:121. Defendant acknowledged that he 
had taken the computer equipment from Myers' residence. R287:122. While asserting 
Myers had built the computer from him to use, he nevertheless acknowledged that the 
computer was not his. R287:123. After reading a copy of defendant's letter to Myers, 
Deputy Boughn told defendant that it did not appear to him that defendant had a right to take 
the computer from Myers' residence. R287:124. As the stolen computer was loaded into the 
police car, "[defendant] . . . stated that he had an ownership interest in the computer and 
believed he was entitled to retain possession of [it]." R287:130. 
The Defense 
Defendant introduced himself as "Reverend Edward Allen Buck." R287:132. He 
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described his relationship with Myers as "a cooperative business relationship and a 
friendship." Id. Under the Supreme Cavalry agreement, defendant understood that he and 
Myers would share profits 50/50, Myers would provide the financial support, and he would 
provide the intellectual property, manufacture, and sales. Id. 
Defendant described how the Spirit bitless bridle, which he claimed to have invented, 
was different from a conventional bridle. R287:134. He believed that he could sell hundreds 
of thousands of the bridles, because it was the most humane way to work with horses. 
R287:135. His former partner, Dr. Robert Cook, had been the chief veterinary officer at 
Spirit Horse Limited, a predecessor company to Supreme Calvary, but defendant claimed that 
Dr. Cook left the company, stole defendant's original 1988 design, and patented it. 
R287:135-136. Defendant admitted that he had received a settlement from one of his 
lawsuits against Dr. Cook, which was based on defendant's 1988 design of the bridle. 
R287:155-56. Nevertheless, in 2003 he, pro se, sued Dr. Cook again, and the United States 
Patent Office, for fraudulent procurement. R287:136,142,156-57. Myers agreed to provide 
defendant with a computer to prosecute the lawsuit, for which Myers would receive ten 
percent of damages if the lawsuit was successful. R287:136-37. 
Defendant never saw anyone else use the computer that Myers assembled for him, nor 
did he find on the computer any files that belonged to anyone else. R287:142-43. 
In answer to whether he took the computer believing that he had an ownership interest 
in it, defendant answered: "My understanding was that [Myers] had made the computer, put 
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the computer together because it was not together when we got there. He built the computer 
for me and gave it to me and said that this is your computer and I assumed because we had 
an agreement with the lawsuit and then [sic] subsequent agreement with the Spirit Supreme 
Calvary that it was part of a partnership, a working agreement." R287:143-44. He was 
"astonished" when police officers came to his home. R287:144. He did not believe he had 
committed a crime. Id. He wrote the letter to Myers because, in discovering that his name 
was not associated with Supreme Calvary, a company "that was totally about me and my 
product and my method" he had been deprived of his "intellectual [] and physical []" property, 
and so decided that he had no partnership. R287:145-46. 
In answer to the question about why he would have to remunerate Myers for the 
computer if it had been given to him or the partnership, defendant answered, "Because even 
though he'd stolen from me, I wouldn't steal from him." R287:146. He believed that 
because the computer belonged to the partnership he was entitled to it. R287:149 
Defendant acknowledged that he did not put any money into the partnership; that he 
did not pay Myers any money for the computer, that he never mentioned a price for the 
computer in his letter; that he did not supply a telephone number where he could be reached, 
give Myers a date by which he would pay him for the computer, or consult with him about 
taking the computer; and that he took the computer when Myers was gone because he was 
upset after Myers' refused to fund defendant's trip to Kentucky to school the only white 
thoroughbred in the country in dressage with the bridle. R287:145, 153-54; State's Exhibit 
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3,p.2. 
At the close of evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the State 
had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not have an honest belief 
that he had a right to obtain or exercise control over the property or that if the owner had 
been present the owner would have consented to his control over the property. R287:162. 
The trial court denied the motion. R287:163 
The jury convicted defendant of theft, as charged. R287: 195-96;226. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court should not consider defendant's claim of insufficient evidence under the 
reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model because it is simply inapplicable to this case. The 
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when the jury is correctly instructed that it 
may convict a defendant only upon finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no 
need to provide the jury with a reasonable-alternative-hypothesis instruction. Here, 
defendant never claimed below and does not claim on appeal that the reasonable doubt 
instruction given to the jury was deficient. 
Further, the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model is inapplicable on its terms. The 
sufficiency of evidence may be weighed under that model when the evidence is purely 
circumstantial. Here, there was direct evidence that the computer belonged only to Myers, 
that it was never part of partnership property, that defendant knew he was not permitted to 
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remove the computer from Myers' home, that defendant took the computer because he was 
upset with Myers, and that he communicated in writing that he did not intend to return it. 
Further, the trial court gave an instruction that fully reflected the only hypothesis of 
innocence defendant pursued at trial. The jury was instructed that if the State was unable to 
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with an honest belief, it must find 
him not guilty. In fact, defendant invited any error. He confirmed that he had no exception 
to the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction, and then stipulated to a jury instruction that 
charged the State to disprove his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft and to rebut 
that defendant had an honest belief that he was entitled to take the computer or that Myers 
would have consented to his taking it. There was evidence that defendant took the computer 
because he was upset with Myers' efforts in promoting the partnership, that he took it 
surreptitiously, that he had no intention of returning it, and that he could not have honestly 
believed that he was entitled to it as a partner, given his negligible contribution to the 
partnership. 
POINT II 
The prosecutor's remarks during final closing argument were not improper. Contrary 
to defendant's argument, remarks that Myers and not defendant owned certain software and 
the licenses to that software were undisputedly established by the evidence. Myers testified 
that he had paid for all of the software components and programs on the computer, that he 
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also owned the licenses associated with the software, and that he typically would rebuild his 
computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or Microsoft Office 2003 Professional 
and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. Defendant did not object to this testimony. Any claim 
that the evidence failed to establish what precise operating systems were on a computer that 
was indisputably operable is trivial. Similarly, any claim that the evidence failed to establish 
that defendant was unaware that computer software licenses universally demand that the 
owner not transfer the software is unpersuasive. Finally, it is not clear, as defendant claims, 
that the prosecutor asked the jury to infer that, given defendant's likely understanding that 
the licenses precluded Myers from giving the software away, defendant thereby could not 
have had an honest belief that he had a right to the computer. Rather, the prosecutor's 
concluding remark might equally have meant just what he said: "So, just 'cause you used it 
and needed it, that's not a sufficient basis to have an honest belief." Thus, the prosecutor's 
remarks were, at most, questionable. 
Even if the prosecutors remarks were improper, defendant was not prejudiced. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, evidence of defendant guilt for theft was strong. 
Additionally, defendant's failure to timely object to the prosecutor's remarks 
aggravated any prejudice stemming from those remarks. Defendant did not claim 
prosecutorial misconduct until he filed his motion to arrest judgment, thirty-three days after 
trial. He only raised the precise argument urged on appeal, and then only casually, at the 
hearing on his motion, more than one month later. Thus, defendant deprived the trial court 
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of a timely opportunity to strike any objectionable argument or to give a specific curative 
instruction and thereby mitigate any prejudice stemming from the remarks to which he now 
complains. Nevertheless, the jury was not without guidance concerning the remarks. The 
trial court instructed the jury concerning the nature of evidence, that lawyers merely present 
it, and that "[w]hat lawyers say is not evidence." In light of the strength of the State's case, 
defendant's actions that limited the trial court's ability to mitigate any prejudice, and 
instructions that properly guided the jury's processing of argument, any misconduct was 
harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT 
STOLE MYERS5 COMPUTER 
Defendant claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence. Aplt. Br. at 24. He argues that the State presented only circumstantial evidence 
"that [he] took the computer with the specific intent to commit theft rather than with an 
honest belief ['that he had an ownership interest in it or that Myers, if present, would not 
have objected to his taking it.']" Aplt. Br. at 30-31. Consequently, he argues, the State was 
required to prove that the evidence "'preclude[d] every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'" 
Aplt. Br. at 24-28 (quoting State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782,786 (Utah App. 1998), affd, 1999 
UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. He suggests under that test "it is possible that the marshaling 
requirement does not apply to circumstantial evidence cases." Aplt. Br. at 28. Nevertheless, 
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defendant does, albeit incompletely, undertake that requirement, finally arguing that under 
the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model the evidence was insufficient to show that he 
lacked an honest belief. Aplt. Br. at 28-34. 
The Court should decline to review this case under the reasonable-alternative-
hypothesis model because it is unnecessary under the facts of this case: The Utah Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that review under that model is unnecessary where the jury is 
correctly instructed on reasonable doubt; this is not a case of exclusively circumstantial 
evidence; an instruction was given that fully expressed the only hypothesis on innocence 
defendant pursued; and, defendant both failed to preserve his present claim and/or invited 
any error. Therefore, the Court should review defendant's claim of insufficient evidence only 
under its usual sufficiency standard. Here, evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant took the computer with the specific intent to commit theft 
and that he lacked an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in the computer or that 
Myers, if present, would not have objected to his taking it. 
A. The reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model is not 
required to determine the sufficiency of evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when the jury is correctly 
instructed on the requirement that it may convict a defendant only upon finding him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no need to provide the jury with a reasonable-alternative-
hypothesis instruction. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 n.l (Utah 1992) ( "With 
regard to the 'no reasonable alternative hypothesis' theory upon which defendant proceeds, 
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we note that this court has previously indicated that this is only one way of stating the 
prosecution's burden of proof, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt/9) (citing 
State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980)); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1312 
(Utah 1986) (affirming its rule that [a reasonable alternative hypothesis] instruction is 
unnecessary "'where the jury is instructed that the State must prove a defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt'") (quoting State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985)); 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255,257,470 P.2d 246,247 (1970) ("[If'from all of the facts and 
circumstances shown' the jurors] are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's 
guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded the evidence as excluding every other 
reasonable hypothesis."); Layman, 1999 UT 79, fflf 2, 10 (holding that the court of appeals' 
application of the reasonable alternative hypothesis doctrine was "problematic and 
unnecessary" and asserting that the case "should have been decided by applying an ordinary 
sufficiency of the evidence test"). 
Here, defendant does not claim that the reasonable doubt instruction given to the jury 
was deficient. Thus, the Court should not apply the reasonable-alternative hypothesis model 
in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Further, the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model does not apply because this is 
not a case of exclusively circumstantial evidence, as defendant insists. Aplt. Br. at 25-30. 
"Where the only evidence presented against the defendant is circumstantial, the 
evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." 
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State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) (citing State v. Romero, 554 
P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976)). However, this rule "is not controlling when only part of the 
evidence is circumstantial." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) (citation 
omitted). 
Circumstantial evidence, is [e]vidence based on inference and not on personal 
knowledge or observation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (8th ed. 2004). Direct evidence, 
on the other hand, is "e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, 
if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption." Id. at 596. 
Here, evidence disproving that defendant acted with an honest belief, the sole 
contested issue at trial, was not exclusively circumstantial, but also consisted of direct 
evidence: Myers testified that any computers used in partnership belonged only to him and 
that the computer defendant later took from his home was never partnership property 
(R287:56,72); Myers also testified that he had never allowed defendant to take the computer 
from the house, and he did not give his permission to take it while he was away (R287:65, 
71); defendant wrote a letter in which he told Myers that he had taken the computer (State's 
Exhibit 3); and, defendant was found in possession of the computer and admitted that he had 
taken it from Myers' home (R287:121-22). Most importantly, the tone of defendant's letter 
clearly suggested defendant took the computer, not because he had an honest belief that he 
was entitled to it, but because he believed that Myers had failed to uphold his commitment 
to the partnership. See State's Exhibit 3. Defendant confirmed that sentiment on the stand 
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when, in answer to the question about why he would have to remunerate Myers for the 
computer if it had been given to him or the partnership, he answered, "Because even though 
he'd stolen from me, I wouldn't steal from him." R287:146. In sum, because there was 
direct evidence concerning defendant's lack of honest belief, the reasonable-alternative-
hypothesis model should not be applied in this case. 
Furthermore, the narrow command that circumstantial evidence must "preclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence," Layman, 953 P.2d at 786, has been recognized by this 
Court to overstate the reasonable doubt requirement. In State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah 
App. 1998), the Court stated, "'[t]he existence of one or more alternate reasonable 
hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 281 (quoting State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,695 (Utah 
App. 1995)). "' [W]e must simply insur[e] that there is sufficient evidence as to each element 
of the charge to enable the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
committed the crime.'" Id. at 282 (quoting Blubaugh, id). "[I]t is then within the province 
of the jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and reject 
these alternate hypotheses.'" Id. (quoting Blubaugh, id.). 
Moreover, defendant fails to acknowledge that he stipulated to a jury instruction 
which fully reflected the only hypothesis of innocence he pursued at trial, which tracked 
almost verbatim the honest belief defense provided by UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402 (West 
2004): 
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You are instructed that it is a complete defense to a charge of theft that a person: 
(A) acted under an honest claim of right to the property involved; or 
(B) acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise 
control over the property as he did; or 
(C) obtained or exercised control over the property honestly believing that 
the owner, if present, would have consented. 
R183, 192; Instruction #33, R220 (Addendum C). The instruction fiirther stated that 
defendant had only to put on some evidence which tended to show that defendant acted with 
such honest belief, in which case "then the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Buck did not act with such an honest belief or honest claim of 
right." Id. The instruction finally stated: "If after consideration of all evidence in the case, 
you are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Buck acted with kind of honest belief 
or honest claim of right to the property, then you must find him 'not guilty.'" Id. In short, 
Instruction #33 effectively instructed the jury that the evidence "preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence" under the traditional proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt requirement. 
And to the extent defendant now implies that the jury was not fully instructed on his 
reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model, defendant invited any error by stipulating to 
Instruction 33. Defendant never argued in his motion to dismiss or to the jury that the 
question of his guilt or innocence should have been tested under the reasonable-alternative-
hypothesis model, nor did he request an instruction beyond Instruction #33. See State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^  9, 86 P.3d 742 ("'[A] party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'") (citation 
omitted). 
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B. The standard of review. 
"In making the determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold a 
conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder." State v. Merila, 966 P.2d 
270, 272 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991), quoting 
State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146,1150 (Utah 1991)). "It is the exclusive function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Lamm, 606 
P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). It is not the function of a reviewing court "to determine guilt 
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the 
weight to be given defendant's testimony." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1976) 
(citations omitted). "The mere existence of conflicting evidence, therefore, does not warrant 
reversal.'" Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150 (citations omitted). "'Rather, the function of a 
reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence regarding 
each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant committed the crime.'" Id. (citations omitted). "Therefore, when reviewing a 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may 
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." Id. (citations 
omitted). "It is only when the evidence, viewed in this light, is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt 
that it is proper to overturn the conviction." Id. (citations omitted). "'So long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
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elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.'" State v. Boss, 2005 UT 
App 520, \ 9, 127 P.3d 1236 (quoting State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 67, 27 P.3d 1115). 
Though this is not a case of exclusively circumstantial evidence. However, even if 
it was, the foregoing standard similarly applies. 
C. Evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant did not honestly believe that he had an ownership interest in 
the computer or that Myers, if present, would not have objected to his 
taking it. 
To prove defendant guilty of theft the State was required to prove that defendant took 
the computer with the purpose to deprive Myers of it. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 
(West 2004). "'Purpose to deprive' means to have the conscious object to withhold property 
permanently or for so extended a period or to use under circumstances that a substantial 
portion of its economic value, or the use or benefit thereof would be lost.55 UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-401 (West 2004). The jury was instructed on these elements and definitions. 
See Instruction #'s 29 and 34, R2165 221 (Addendum C). 
The jury was also instructed as to defendant's theory of the defense: In taking the 
computer, defendant acted under an honest claim of right, or that he had an honest belief that 
he had a right to take the computer, or that he took the computer honestly believing that 
Myers, if present, would have consented. See Instruction #33, R220 (Addendum C). The 
jury was instructed that to prove defendant guilty of theft, the State was required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted without such honest belief. Id. 
Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove the only contested issue at trial, that 
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defendant intended deprive Myers of the computer or, alternatively, that he did not have an 
honest belief that he had the right to take the computer: 
• All of the material resources of the partnership belonged to or were 
contributed exclusively by Myers: 
• All the money put into the business-to maintain the website and pay for 
services-came from Myers' computer business and Myers' personal 
and business accounts (R287:53, 56); 
• Defendant did not contribute any money, including the $100 expected of 
each partner, with the exception of the deposit of one paycheck 
(R287:53-55); 
• The partnership never owned any assets (R287:56); 
• Myers alone supported the business with his personal income and his 
own computer business (R287:56); 
• Any computers used in partnership belonged only to Myers, and the 
computer defendant iater took from Myers' home was never partnership 
property (R287:56, 72); 
• Myers paid for the computer, all of its hardware and software components, 
including the programs and Internet access, and the monitor and 
keyboard (R287:73-74); 
• Defendant's sole material contribution to the partnership was the deposit of 
a single paycheck; however, he withdrew more money than he deposited 
(R287:55, 75); 
• The partnership sold only a single bridle (R287:54); 
• Myers assembled a computer for defendant to use (R287:58-63); 
• All of Myers family and he used the computer, which was networked to 
the other computers in the home (R287:58, 60); 
• When Myers returned from a ten-day trip, the computer he gave defendant to 
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use was gone (R287:66); he found a letter from defendant, in which: 
• Defendant derided Myers' personal, spiritual, and financial integrity, 
castigated him for his spiritual deficiencies, and rebuked him for 
repeatedly failing to adequately support their partnership (R287:65-66, 
State's Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2); 
• Defendant informed Myers that he was taking the computer, and that he 
would pay for the computer later; however, the letter stated 
no date or amount for payment (State's Exhibit 3, p. 2); 
• Defendant failed to give any information about how he could be 
currently contacted (State's Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2); 
• Myers had never allowed defendant to take the computer from his home, and he did 
not give him his permission to take it while he was away (R287:65, 71); 
• Myers only discovered defendant's whereabouts when he called defendant's 
employer, receiving a response that felt "not right" (R287:69-70); 
• Defendant admitted to the police that the computer was not his (R287:123); 
• Defendant admitted that he took the computer when Myers was gone 
because he was upset with Myers (R287:145,153-54; State's Exhibit 3, p.2). 
This evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict. It supports in a 
variety of ways that defendant took Myers' computer with a purpose to deprive him of it. 
Defendant's taking the computer was motivated by a long-festering upset with Myers about 
how their business venture should be conducted and his belief that Myers had repeatedly 
failed to support it. His promise to pay for the computer rung hollow because it was silent 
about when or how much he would pay. The jury could have inferred from defendant's 
impecunious condition—he arrived at Myers' residence with a car full of personal belongings 
and lived in Myers basement rent-free for a year and half until asked to support himself— 
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that he had no intention of paying. R287:52, 54-55, 81, 88-89. In fact, by taking the 
computer and unilaterally asserting that he would later pay a price he determined to be 
appropriate, defendant acknowledged that he had no intention of returning the computer. 
Defendant provided no information about how he could be located. And defendant's letter, 
in addition to his self-bestowed appellation, "Rev. Edward Allan Buck," trumpeted a smugly 
righteous tone, from which the jury could have inferred that he stole the computer out of 
anger and malice, and to purposely deprive Myers of it. See State's Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2. 
The evidence equally supports that defendant stole the computer without an honest 
belief that he had an interest that entitled him to take the computer or that Myers would have 
consented if he had been present. Defendant stole the computer when Myers was away and 
because he was upset with him, clearly undermining any honest belief that Myers would have 
consented. The great weight of evidence also undercuts defendant's claim that the computer 
was partnership property and that he honestly felt he was thereby entitled to it: Defendant 
contributed almost nothing to the partnership, which was already an apparent failure not long 
after it was initiated. Myers, on the other hand, contributed all of the funding to the 
enterprise. Myers specifically stated that the computer was never partnership property and 
was assembled only for defendant's use in Myers residence. Myers also never allowed 
defendant to take the computer from his home, nor did he give defendant permission to take 
it while he was away. Myers and his family used the computer, and it was networked to 
Myers' other computers. When Myers tried to locate defendant, he got a "not right" feeling 
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from defendant's employer. Defendant admitted to the police that the computer was not his. 
This evidence undercuts any honest belief of entitlement. Defendant took the computer 
surreptitiously, he contributed disproportionately little to the partnership, he had no 
reasonable basis for believing that the computer was partnership property or that he could 
take it from Myers home, he was apparently hiding out in his employer's home, and he 
admitted to the police when arrested that the computer was not his. In sum, the evidence was 
sufficient to prove that defendant acted with a purpose to deprive Myers of the computer and 
that he did so without an honest belief. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that his relationship with Myers evidenced a working 
partnership that justified his honest belief in taking the computer. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. 
Defendant relies on the fact that "Myers routinely exhibited a willingness to financially 
support [him], that Myers "allowed [defendant] to live in his house rent-free," that he and 
Myers had a joint bank, and that defendant believed that the computer was essential to the 
partnership so that he could pursue his patent suit. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Defendant also 
characterizes the above facts set out by the State differently to show that he was acting with 
an honest belief. Aplt. Br. at 31-34. He concludes by arguing that those facts are so far 
"against the clear weight of the evidence," that this Court may act as a second fact-finder to 
overturn the jury's verdict. Aplt. Br. at 35-40. 
Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive. The jury weighed the evidence and found 
defendant guilty as charged. See Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150 ("The mere existence of 
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conflicting evidence... does not warrant reversal.'"). Moreover, defendant's arguments that 
this court should act as a second fact-finder are contrary to well-established law. See Merila, 
966 P.2d at 272 ("In making the determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to 
uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder."). Defendant cites 
no relevant authority for such an approach in a case in a jury trial in which the quantum of 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict was so clearly sufficient. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS WERE, AT MOST, 
QUESTIONABLE; IN ANY CASE, ANY MISCONDUCT WAS 
HARMLESS GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE, 
DEFENDANT'S OWN FAILURE TO OBJECT OR REQUEST A 
CURATIVE INSTRUCTION, AND THE PROVISION OF 
INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY GUIDING THE JURY'S REGARD OF 
COUNSELS' ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that in final closing argument the prosecutor improperly referred to 
matters not in evidence and prejudicially drew inferences as to defendant's guilty mind by 
referring to those matters. Aplt. Br. at 15-23. Specifically, he argues that, without 
evidentiary foundation, the prosecutor referred to specific software that was on the computer, 
the limiting effect of licenses associated with the software which precluded the owner from 
giving the software away, and defendant's awareness of the limiting effect of those licenses. 
Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant argues that the prosecutor relied on those unestablished facts to 
infer that defendant could not have had an honest belief that the computer belonged to him 
because he would have known that the licenses precluded Myers' from giving him the 
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software loaded on the computer. Aplt. Br. at 20. The prosecutor's remarks, he claims, were 
prejudicial because not only was the State's case not strong, but also the timing of the 
prosecutor's argument precluded him from objecting or the trial court's giving a curative 
instruction. Aplt. Br. at 20-23. 
The argument fails because the prosecutor's remarks constituted fair argument from 
the evidence or were, at most, questionable. In any case, any alleged misconduct was 
harmless given the strength of the State's evidence and defendant's own failure to timely 
object or request a curative instruction. Further, the trial court's preliminary instructions 
provided the jury with sufficient guidance about how to regard argument of counsel. 
A. Factual background. 
On direct examination in the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor elicited from Myers 
that he typically would rebuild his computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or 
Microsoft Office 2003 Professional and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. R287:57. He 
might also add other tools for web development. Id, The prosecutor also elicited that Myers 
owned the licenses associated with these programs. Defendant did not object to Myers' 
testimony. Id. 
In final closing argument, the prosecutor began by disputing the defense theory that 
the computer defendant stole was an asset of the partnership. R287:185. Apart from the 
website Myers created and the bridle, he argued, the partnership had no assets. Id. at 185-86. 
Accordingly, the prosecutor continued, the computer was not an asset of the partnership. 
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Rather, along with Myers' family, defendant was merely permitted to use the computer. Id, 
at 186. Then the prosecutor reviewed the circumstances of defendant's taking the computer: 
Defendant took it without permission when Myers was not home, leaving a letter with only 
a Las Vegas address and without any telephone number, and asserting that he had used and 
needed the computer. Id, at 186-87. 
The prosecutor then stated: 
Who did the operating system belong to? Who owned the licenses of those 
items? Those were owned by Mr. Myers. Mr. Myers didn't have the ability 
to give them up even if (inaudible). They were operating systems on there, 
Windows Microsoft Word, Acrobat Adobe, again these are things you can't 
just give away. All the components were (inaudible). So, just 'cause you used 
it and needed it, that's not a sufficient basis to have an honest belief. 
Id. at 187. Defendant did not object to these remarks. Id, 
The prosecutor further argued that although defendant told the police that Myers had 
made the computer for him, he nevertheless admitted that the computer did not belong to 
him. Id. And although defendant claimed an interest in the computer, the prosecutor stated 
that Myers "owned that property." Id. 
The prosecutor then responded to an analogy posed by defendant in his argument and 
challenged defendant's claim of honest belief. Id. at 188-89. He argued that the only way 
a person in defendant's position could have had an honest belief that he was permitted to take 
the computer was if he had Myers' agreement. Id, at 189-90. But, he concluded, defendant 
did not have such an agreement. Id. at 190. 
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The prosecutor's final closing argument comprises 116 lines of transcript. The 
challenged remarks comprise just over six lines. R287:185-190. 
Thirty-three days after the jury found him guilty of theft, but before 
sentencingdefendant filed a motion to arrest judgment alleging prosecutorial misconduct and 
insufficient evidence. R23 5. As to prosecutorial misconduct, defendant argued only that the 
prosecutor improperly urged to jury to convict him of also having stolen computer software, 
which defendant claimed was an offense for which he had not been charged and to which he 
was unable to respond because it was delivered in the prosecutor's final closing argument. 
R242-44. At the hearing on the motion one month later, defendant argued the same theory. 
R286:8-12. Only in concluding did he briefly assert, for the first time, that the prosecutor 
improperly argued that defendant knew the software could not be given to him. R286:12. 
The trial court denied the motion: 
I listened to the evidence in this case. I listened to closing arguments. 
I do not find that there was any error made. Certainly if there was, I'd find it 
to be harmless. This case was heard before a jury. The jury reached a verdict 
and I'm not going to grant the motion to arrest judgment. 
R286:14. 
B. The standard of review. 
'"Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor's comments call the jurors' 
attention to matters not proper for their consideration and when the comments have a 
reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict.' " State 
v. Redding, 2007 UT App 350, \ 26,172 P.3d 319 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, \ 18, 
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8 P.3d 1025). "In undertaking this evaluation, we are mindful that '[a] criminal conviction 
is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone."5 
State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, f 31,173 P.3d 170 (quoting United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 
915 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir.1990)). "Rather, '[i]mproper prosecutorial comments require 
reversal only if [they] substantially affected the defendant's right to a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting 
Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d at 956). See also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) 
(same). "Furthermore,' [fjor an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome 
must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987)). 
"'In determining whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the 
statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.'" Todd, 
2007 UT App 349, f 14 (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992)) 
(additional citations omitted). "'Further, because the trial court is in the best position to 
determine the impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its rulings on whether the 
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.'" 
Id. (citations omitted). 
C. The prosecutor's remarks were, at most, questionable. 
" 'In summing up a case before a jury, counsel may not introduce or comment on facts 
outside the evidence, but reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence and 
considerable latitude is allowed in discussing it. Counsel may appeal to the jury with all the 
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power and persuasiveness his learning, skill and experience enable him to use.' " State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 51, 55 P.3d 1131, cert denied, 63 P.3d 104 (2003) (citation 
omitted). 
In final closing argument, the prosecutor asked two rhetorical questions, which he 
answered himself, and made two assertions of fact, all to this effect: Myers, not defendant, 
owned the Windows Microsoft Word and Acrobat Adobe operating systems on the computer, 
and the licenses to that software forbade Myers from giving the operating systems away. 
R287:187. 
That statement was substantially established by the evidence. Myers testified he had 
paid for all of the software components and programs on the computer. R287:73-74. 
Typically, he would rebuild his computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or 
Microsoft Office 2003 Professional and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. R287:57. Myers 
also owned the licenses associated with these programs. Id. Defendant did not object to any 
of this testimony. 
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that during the presentation of evidence 
the State "did not establish what software was on the computer," apparently focusing on 
Myers' testimony that he "typical[ly]," rather than in this specific case, rebuilt his computers 
with certain operating systems. Aplt. Br. at 19. This claim of misconduct is trivial. No 
evidence is necessary to support an assertion that a personal computer will not operate 
without some type of operating system, and it undisputed that the computer defendant stole 
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was operable, regardless of the specific operating system that Myers installed. 
Similarly, evidence is hardly necessary to show that all computer software is 
purchased with licensing agreements that uniformly demand that the purchaser agree not to 
transfer the software to a third party. And to the extent that such evidence is necessary, the 
omission is trivial. Moreover, the prosecutor's concluding remark—"So, just 'cause 
[defendant] used [the computer] and needed it, that's not a sufficient basis to have an honest 
belief[,]" see R287:187—does not clearly identify the improper inference defendant ascribes 
to it. Defendant claims that the prosecutor's concluding remark implied that defendant could 
not have had an honest belief that the computer belonged to him because he would have 
known that the software licenses precluded Myers' from giving him the software-loaded 
computer. But the statement also supports a different conclusion: Defendant's need and use 
of the computer could not give rise to an honest belief that he was entitled to take it. This 
interpretation is fully supported by the record. 
Modest recharacterization of the evidence does not necessarily "call the jurors' 
attention to matters not proper for their consideration." Redding, 2007 UT App 350, \ 26. 
In State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, 174 P.3d 628, Ross was convicted of aggravated murder and 
attempted aggravated murder after he entered the home of his ex-girlfriend and shot her to 
death and then chased and fired at the victim's boyfriend. Id. at TfTf 1-3. The principal issue 
at trial was whether Ross was guilty of murder or aggravated murder, where it was arguable 
whether "the homicide was incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
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episode . . . during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the 
victim who was killed." Id. at 113 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (l)(b) (West 2004)). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor "seized a sizeable portion of latitude" when (1) he 
implied that Ross had ordered both the victim and her boyfriend into the bedroom where he 
killed the victim, even though the evidence showed that Ross had only pushed the victim 
toward the bedroom; and (2) he asserted that the boyfriend had testified that "very few 
seconds" elapsed between the time Ross killed the victim and when he approached the 
boyfriend and began shooting at him, even though the boyfriend gave no specific time frame 
for the sequence of events. Id. at \ 56. Even though the prosecutor's recharacterization of 
the facts bore "on the main issue in the case"—whether the "the homicide was incident to 
one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode"—the Utah Supreme Court held the 
prosecutor's remarks to only be "questionable" Id. at 57. 
Here, the only "fact" the prosecutor may have improperly implied is that defendant 
was aware of a restrictive license provision, a fact not established by the evidence. Given 
that such awareness can likely be attributed to almost all computer users, the prosecutor's 
assumption was hardly egregious and less "questionable" than the prosecutor's 
misstatements in Ross. 
D. Alternatively, defendant was not prejudiced. 
"The prejudice prong of prosecutorial misconduct analysis requires consideration of 
the circumstances of the case as a whole." Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ^ f 33. "In making such 
32 
a consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt." Id. " 'If proof 
of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed 
prejudicial.' " Id. (quoting Troy, 688 P.2d at 486)." 'Likewise, in a case with less compelling 
proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct.' " Id. (quoting Troy, id.) " 'If the 
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence 
susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be 
improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.' " Id. (quoting Troy, id.)2 
1. Evidence that defendant stole the computer was strong. 
2
 Defendant claims that if prosecutorial misconduct is established, then the State 
can overcome the error only by establishing harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Aolt. Br. at 19. Defendant accuratelv cites dicta in to. 2007 IJT 89. f 54 for thte 
proposition. Nevertheless, the State respectfully suggests that the dicta articulating the 
Utah Supreme Court's expression of that standard was misapplied to the claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct in Ross, and that that standard does not apply in this case. 
The harmless-error-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies only to successful 
claims of constitutional error. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^ f 45, 55 P.3d 573 
("Where the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right, we apply a higher 
standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless we find the error harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.") (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). The court in 
Ross considered a claim of prosecutorial misconduct which did not involve a 
constitutional right. Id. at \ 56. The court, nevertheless, cited State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 
1114, 1116 (Utah 1977), which applied the harmless-error-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard in a case involving a claim of prosecutorial misconduct infringing on the 
constitutional right to silence. Eaton, at 1116 (citing Chapman). In this case, there is no 
claim that the prosecutor's alleged improper remarks infringed any constitutional right. 
Thus, if the prosecutor's remarks are determined to be improper, the correct standard for 
the State's overcoming that error is simple harmlessness. 
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Contrary to defendant's claim, evidence of guilt was strong. Myers owned the 
computer that defendant stole, only allowed defendant to use the computer, never regarded 
it as partnership property, and never permitted defendant to remove it from his house. It was 
undisputed that defendant took the computer without Myers' permission while Myers was 
away from his home because he was upset with him, that defendant left no current contact 
information, that defendant did not indicate when or how much he would pay for the 
computer, and that defendant wrote simply that he was taking the computer. See Aple. Br. 
at Pt.IC. 
2. By failing to timely object to the prosecutor's alleged improper remarks, 
defendant was directly responsible for aggravating any claimed prejudicial 
effect the prosecutor's remarks might have had on the jury. 
This Court has recognized "two additional factors relevant to the determination of 
whether a defendant has been prejudiced by improper statements." Todd, 2007 UT App 349, 
If 34 (citing with approval State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224-25 (Utah 1993)). "The first 
factor is whether defense counsel addressed the improper statements during closing argument 
and the prosecution then 'restricted his surrebuttal comments to the evidence and made no 
further mention of the improper comments." Id. (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. "The 
second factor is whether the trial court gave a curative instruction admonishing the jury to 
'dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence" and instructing them "not to consider the 
statements of counsel as evidence.' "Id. (quoting Dunn, id) 
The first Dunn factor does not precisely apply to this case because the prosecutor 
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made his alleged improper remarks in final, rather than in initial, closing argument. 
Nevertheless, a defendant may still substantially mitigate any prejudice by objecting to 
improper prosecutorial remarks, all to the same effect contemplated by the first Dunn factor. 
Defendant complains that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks "[b]ecause 
the State raised its improper argument for the first time during its closing rebuttal, [and, so,] 
had no warning about it and no opportunity to defend himself against it." Aplt. Br. at 20. As 
a consequence, defendant further argues, "the trial court offered no curative instruction to 
ensure that the jury knew it should disregard the State's comment." Aplt. Br. at 20-21. That 
claim does not fully and fairly represent the facts of this case or the law. 
As set out above, the prosecutor elicited from Myers on direct examination all the 
facts complained of in his final closing argument, except the possibility that defendant knew 
of the restrictive nature of the licenses associated with the software. R287:57. Thus, it is an 
overstatement that defendant "had no warning" about the prosecutor's argument. 
More importantly, defendant implies that because the prosecutor made his remarks in 
final closing argument, he was helpless to respond. Utah appellate courts have rejected that 
position, recognizing that a defendant has a duty to object even if he is not in a position to 
respond substantively. In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), the court rejected a 
claim that the prosecutor had made prejudicially improper comments in rebuttal to the 
defendant's closing arguments. Id. at 426. The court noted that "[djefendant failed to assert 
an objection during the course of argument, and the trial court was deprived of the 
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opportunity to determine the matter or caution the jury." Id. See also State v. Brown, 948 
P.2d 337, 344-45 (Utah 1997) (refusing to consider under plain error alleged improper 
remarks in closing rebuttal where counsel strategically chose not to object). State v. Palmer, 
860 P.2d 339, 344-45 (Utah App. 1993) (observing in response to claim of numerous 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including comments made in final closing, "[w]hether 
or not objections to such misstatements are to be made is trial counsel's decision," and that 
"[i]In the vast majority of instances, failure to object to such a misstatement will be deemed 
a waiver of the error") Numerous other jurisdictions have similarly recognized that defense 
counsel should object in response to alleged improper prosecutorial comments in final 
closing argument. See e.g., United States v. Vallie, 284 F.3d 917, 922 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to hold prejudice established where "Vallie did not object to the challenged 
statement during closing argument, request a curative instruction on it, or move for a 
mistrial."); State v. Andrews, 726 A.2d 104,113 (Conn. 1999) (defense counsel's failure to 
object to the prosecutor's argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not 
believe that is was unfair in light of the record of the case at the time."); People v. 
Krutsinger, 121 P.3d 318, 324 (Colo. App. 2005) ("[A] defendant's failure to object 
suggests, that at least at the time the comment was made, 'the live argument was not overly 
damaging.' ") (citation omitted). 
Moreover, by not timely objecting to the prosecutor's remarks, a defendant may 
deprive the trial court of an opportunity to strike any objectionable argument or to give a 
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timely curative instruction and thereby mitigate any prejudice stemming from the remarks 
to which he now complains. " '[CJurative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of 
our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors 
at trial.5 " See Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ^ 43 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 
(Utah 1998)). "Indeed," the Court continued, 
[i]f a trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be 
successfully concluded. Moreover, our judicial system greatly relies upon the 
juryfs integrity to uphold the jury oath, including its promise to follow all of the 
judge's instructions.... [Virtually every jurisdiction, both state and federal, 
relies upon such instructions in curing errors during trial and in reviewing 
errors on appeal. 
See id. (quoting Harmon, id.) (brackets in original). Todd did not object until the prosecutor 
was entirely finished with her closing argument. Id. at ]f 44, 44 n.4 (postulating that the 
delayed objection may even have been a "strategic maneuver") The Court stated: "Had 
[defendant's counsel objected earlier, the curative instruction would have been more closely 
linked in time to the improper statements. Therefore, the delay in [defendant's objection 
directly caused the timing problem of which he now complains." Id. at Tf 44. The Court 
further observed that "defense counsel's silence during closing argument allowed additional 
improper statements to be made. Had [defendant's counsel objected as soon as he recognized 
what the prosecutor was doing, the harmful remarks would have been greatly curtailed and, 
presumably, more timely addressed." Id. at f^ 44 n.4. 
Here, defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks at trial. Rather, he only 
challenged those remarks in his motion to arrest judgment, thirty-three days after trial had 
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concluded. R235. More than another month passed before he raised the claim of which he 
now complains, and then only barely. R286:8-12. Thus, defendant deprived the trial court 
of a timely opportunity to strike any objectionable argument or to give a specific curative 
instruction and thereby mitigate any prejudice stemming from the remarks to which he now 
complains. 
Nevertheless, in spite of defendant's failure to timely object, the jury was not without 
guidance regarding closing argument. The trial court instructed the jury that "[evidence] can 
be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations that certain facts exist 
(Instruction #7, R207; 287:29); "[i]t is the role of lawyers to present evidence" (Instruction 
#3, R206; 287:27); "[w]hat lawyers say is not evidence" (Instruction #9, R208; 287:31); and 
the jury's role was render a verdict "based only on the evidence produced here in court [and] 
. . . based on facts, not on speculation." (Instruction #6; R207; 287:29). These instructions 
were sufficient to cure any error. See Valdez, 513 P.2d 426 (impliedly holding that 
instructions that admonished the jury to consider only properly admitted evidence and to 
disregard counsels' arguments as to what evidence was unless correctly stated or shown in 
evidence cured any prosecutorial misconduct). 
In any case, the comments did not prejudice defendant's case. First, the prosecutor's 
remarks were not clearly improper, but at most questionable. Moreover, evidence was strong 
both that defendant intended to permanently deprive Myers of the computer and that 
defendant could not reasonably have had an honest belief that he had a right to obtain or 
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exercise control over the computer or that Myers would have consented to his taking the 
computer. See Ross, 2007 UT 89 at ffif 57-58 (holding that "questionable" remarks harmless 
in light of "strong" evidence of guilt); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 350 (noting as to multiple 
instances of misconduct, including unsupported innuendo, examination on veracity of other 
witnesses, argument on matters not in evidence and constitutional right to silence, that" any 
one of these errors would in itself be harmless") Although defendant was not in a position 
to respond substantively to the prosecutor's remarks, he either strategically chose not to 
object or simply failed to object, thereby aggravating any prejudice that may have stemmed 
from the prosecutor's remarks. And finally, the jury was told that the statements of counsel 
were not evidence and, consequently, could not be the basis of conviction. In short, any 
misconduct arising from the prosecutor's remarks was harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State requests that the Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. [0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a) 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ Day of May 2008. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
/KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this^^Day of May 2008, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Addendum A 
CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 1 . Definitions 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and 
intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written 
instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real 
or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value 
to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such as telecommunica-
tions, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or 
any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, proce-
dure, formula or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only 
to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, whether to 
the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to secure performance 
thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any facsimile, replica, 
photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use 
under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or 
of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
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that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily 
limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by 
trespassoiy taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact 
that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; 
or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judg-
ment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a 
lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the 
enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security interest, claim, or 
impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in 
the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the 
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-401. 
§ 76-6—402. Presumptions and defenses 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation 
of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the 
person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the 
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is 
not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of this 
subsection shall not include a security interest for the repayment of a debt or 
obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise 
control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly 
believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 16. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 . Theft—Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-404. 
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Addendum B 
Rev. Edward Allan Buck, "Spirit Horse" 
6133 Rifle Crest Ave 
Las Vegas, NV 89156 
LISTEN TO SPIRIT 
NOT MAN 
August 23,2005 
Mr. Allen Myers 
2346 E. Charros Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Allen, 
It is with a heavy heart and a clear conscious that I leave you behind me and my Spirit Bridle. I 
highly appreciate the opportunity of filing the law suit against Cook; however, everything else 
heavily out weighs that bit of usefulness in my life. 
Luke Chapter 10 verse 10 & 11 say this, 10 "But whatever city you enter and they do not receive you, 
go out into its streets and say", 11 "Even the dust of your city which clings to our feet, we wipe off 
against you, yet be sure of this that the kingdom of God has come near." 
The kingdom of Heaven is around you but you do not have eyes to see or ears to hear and your mouth 
stays not silent in humility. 
This is the hardest letter I have ever had to write, but your actions and lack of actions have forced me 
to act for my health and welfare. You made a commitment to supposedly be a business partner, 
however, your commitment has been not to sacrifice and really commit to the business but rather it 
has been to do as little as possible and expect the most in return. In trying to do business with others, 
you want everything cut rate and the heck with the fact that someone else needs to earn a living from 
what they provide and this turns people against you and what you have to offer. 
I have loved as a brother and you have treated me as a cash cow, providing me with as little as 
possible to exist while expecting a gigantic return. You have lost me and a great future that will 
materialize shortly. The reason is simple; you lack the integrity and humility to be truly spiritual. 
You use your free will nature to be an emotional and physical bully to others and if anything is said 
against you, you either try and throw it back on those speaking or blame the "Adversary". The only 
place to rest the blame is with you.. .not with outside sources, it is your free will. Your attitude you 
present to everyone is simply that you can do everything better than everyone else and you have done 
it all...no matter what someone says you can out do them. You belittle people with your 
condescending attitude. You are a control freak...'... a dominating, manipulating, power hungry 
individual. 
Supreme Performance Through Supreme Freedom 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
| EXHIBIT NO. ^ T C^> 
CASE NO. <35l40CrTgl 
I DATE REC'D 
IN EVIDENCE 
L CLERK < 
4-14-0-7 
August 23, 2005 
Page 2 
To date you have done as little as possible to advance Spirit Bridle. To date you have not changed 
the web site as I requested July 23, 2005. Instead you demand of me that I use the email account you 
set up instead of what I choose. Once again you bully. The web site is not in our names it is in your 
name and the bank account has your wife's name on it, to wit I did not give you permission to do 
that. The straw that stuck me in the foot and makes me do what Christ said to do, is the fact that you 
chose to ignore the opportunity of a lifetime for me and Spirit Bridle and thus the business. You 
knew I requested a roundtrip airfare to Kentucky and your wife knew the reason and yet you do not 
have the integrity to call me or see me before you take off on a vacation in Oregon. 
I lost my stallion, which was the poster horse for Spirit Bridle {he went to the killers}; because you 
choose not to help and yet I saw you spend thousands of dollars elsewhere. You did not care 
whether I lost all my stuff in storage and yet I saw you spend money elsewhere. You always hated to 
give me money for gas or want to do any repairs to my truck, yet I saw you spend money elsewhere. 
You have whined about the cost of printer paper and cartridges, which basically is the only thing I 
asked from you after I stopped asking for anything for my truck. 
The kicker is this Allen, you whine at me that you have no money and your credit cards are maxed 
out, yet you spend money for things other than your commitment to the business; and I am not talking 
about living expenses. 
Allen, you do not know how to sacrifice and commit from the heart, which is the Spirit Within, nor to 
sacrifice and commit to others physically, emotionally or spiritually and that is sad. You always have 
strings attached, ways that it must profit you in some manner. 
Remember it was you who screamed at me that I am not spiritual, I am not humble, that God does not 
talk to me and that only you can interpret the Scriptures properly! I carry that with me always and 
yet I have still tried so hard to help you and your family. What would President Hinckley, the rest of 
the Members of the Presidency, and the members of your ward think of you if they knew that those 
are the words you spit into peoples faces. 
Please send copies of all receipts you have regarding expenditures related to Spirit Bridle. 
Please immediately shut down the Utah business known as Supreme Cavalry. 
Please immediately shut down the web site known as www.supreme-cavalrv.com 
Please immediately send the photographs that you failed to place upon the website. 
I have the computer as it has only my stuff on it and I need it and I left the wireless unit... I will pay 
you for the computer at fair market value when I have the appropriate funds. 
I wish you all the blessings that Creator can heap upon you. I wish you the blessing of hearing your 
Spirit Within and thus learning to communicate with those around you. I wish the blessing of 
finding true tranquility in this life that comes from hearing the Spirit. 
Rev. Edward Allan Buck 
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Addendum C 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN, Bar No. 9218 
Deputy District Attorney 
8080 South Redwood Road, SI 100 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Telephone: (801) 233-9900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATED 
INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY 
1 Case No. 051400781 
JUDGE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN 
Lohra Miller, District Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Christopher G. Bown, Deputy 
District Attorney, hereby request that the attached jury instructions be included in the instructions 
to be given the jury impaneled in the above-entitled matter. 
Dated this _5 day of , 2007. 
LOHRA MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Christopher G. Bown 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that it is a complete defense to a charge of theft that a person: 
(A) acted under an honest claim of right to the property involved; or 
(B) acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the 
property as he did; or 
(C) obtained or exercised control over the property honestly believing that the owner, if 
present, would have consented. 
The law does do not require a defendant to prove that he acted under this kind of honest 
belief or honest claim of right. What a defendant must do, if the evidence presented by the 
prosecution does not already tend to show it, is to bring forward some evidence which tends to 
show that he acted with this honest belief or honest claim of right to the property. If such 
evidence has been presented, then the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Buck did not act with such an honest belief or honest claim of right. 
If, after consideration of all evidence in this case, you are left with a reasonable doubt as 
to whether Mr. Buck acted with this kind of honest belief or honest claim of right to the property, 
then you must find him cnot guilty.' 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK 
Defendant. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 051400781 
Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one through twenty-seven, given to you 
at the beginning of the trial. There are also attached instruction 27 through included at a later time in the 
proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case 
and must be carefully followed. 
A Dated this 4th da^ of A^ril 2007 
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13. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to 
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from 
that witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give 
what weight you think it deserves. 
14. QUESTIONS BY JURORS DURING THE TRIAL 
A jury member may direct questions to the judge or to a witness. Write the question as it 
arises and hand it to the bailiff who will hand it to me. I will share the same with the 
lawyers who have the right to express an opinion as to whether it is proper. If the 
question is not one that is allowed under the rules of evidence or is otherwise improper, I 
will tell you. Otherwise, the question will generally be allowed. 
I remind you that the lawyers are trained in asking questions that will produce the 
evidence necessary to decide this case. However, if you feel there is something important 
that has been missed or that needs clarification, you may ask a question by complying 
with the procedure outlined in this instruction. 
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the accusations in this case. 
The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. 
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard 
against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
16. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your presumption the defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
17. WHAT IS REASONABLE DOUBT? 
Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only 
necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the 
prosecution's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the 
defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute 
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certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every 
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced 
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find the defendant guilty. If on 
the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that defendant is not guilty, you must 
give defendant the benefit of the doubt and find defendant not guilty. 
[EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED BY COUNSEL] 
18. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which 
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. These 
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-seven (27). We will read 
those after completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to 
the procedure that you should follow. 
19. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss 
this case: 
a. all exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. your notes (if any); 
c. your copy of these instructions; and 
d. the verdict form or forms. 
20. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This 
person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair". The Chair's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b. to represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
c. to sign your verdict and bring it back in court. 
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no more power 
than any other juror. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You are instructed that it is a complete defense to a charge of theft that a person: 
(A) acted under an honest claim of right to the property involved; or 
(B) acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the 
property as he did; or 
(C) obtained or exercised control over the property honestly believing that the owner, if 
present, would have consented. 
The law does do not require a defendant to prove that he acted under this kind of honest 
belief or honest claim of right. What a defendant must do, if the evidence presented by the 
prosecution does not already tend to show it, is to bring forward some evidence which tends to 
show that he acted with this honest belief or honest claim of right to the property. If such 
evidence has been presented, then the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Buck did not act with such an honest belief or honest claim of right. 
If, after consideration of all evidence in this case, you are left with a reasonable doubt as 
to whether Mr. Buck acted with this kind of honest belief or honest claim of right to the property, 
then you must find him 'not guilty.' 
nrsn^^f) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 4 
Before you can convict the defendant, Edward Allen Buck, of the offense of Theft, as 
charged in count 1 of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about August 23, 2005, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, Edward Allen Buck, intentionally or knowingly obtained or exercised control over the 
property of another; and 
f 2^ That the defendant obtained or exercised control over such property with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
3. That the value of the property is or exceeds $300.00 but is less than a $1000.00. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor as charged in count 1 of the 
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one 
or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count 1. 
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